About
I am a behavioral economist with a focus on political economy, working mainly with experiments alongside survey and observational data. Much of my work centers on beliefs about people - what others believe about us, and what we believe about ourselves - and on what these beliefs do to economic and political behavior.
I am on the 2026-2027 job market. I expect to complete my PhD in January 2027.
Job Market Paper
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Respect-Based Reciprocity
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Abstract
This paper proposes and experimentally tests respect-based reciprocity: the idea that people are intrinsically more inclined to support others when they believe those others respect them more, in the sense of holding a more favorable belief about their qualities. I further hypothesize that people reciprocate perceived respect more strongly when they perceive respect from elsewhere as scarce. Two pre-registered experiments test these hypotheses using monetary allocations. The first separates perceived respect from material payoffs, reputational incentives, and intentional acts of kindness or hostility, and shows that higher respect increases support for the person who holds it. In the second, an exogenous reduction in perceived outside respect amplifies the response of costly support to the recipient’s respect. Survey data from the 2016 U.S. election show associations between the respect voters perceive from each candidate and their stated candidate preferences, consistent with both hypotheses. Finally, I illustrate how respect-based reciprocity can change responses to gifts, incentive pay, control and delegation, and political communication, and thereby alter their optimal use.
Working papers
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News Norms
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Abstract
Collective choices such as democratic decision-making depend on people’s attention to public affairs, which is often socially valuable but privately costly. This paper studies news norms, social expectations that “a good citizen stays informed”, and shows how they raise demand for political information through social image. In a pre-registered experiment, making political knowledge observable to peers increases willingness to pay for political news by about 21%. The effect is larger when participants believe their audience cares about being informed and can evaluate knowledge. Cross-national survey evidence shows that news norms are widely perceived and display systematic socioeconomic gradients. Together, the results identify a mechanism through which social environments can increase political information acquisition and contribute to persistent inequalities in political knowledge and political voice.
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Meritocratic Hubris? (Over)confidence and Fairness Views
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Harvard CID overview
Abstract
Feedback is commonly inflated, from school grades and workplace evaluations to AI chatbots. We hypothesize that inflated feedback, by boosting confidence, shifts fairness perceptions toward greater acceptance of inequality, even absent any material stake. In a preregistered online experiment with a US-representative sample, we subtly inflate performance feedback for identical test performances, which raises both overestimation and overplacement. Acting as impartial spectators, treated participants redistribute significantly less to lower-performing workers, reducing the extent of redistribution by about 14%. The effect is strongest among those who attribute performance to skill and effort, and text analysis points to motivated attention to performance as the operative channel.